ABSTRACT With a trusted-third-party (TTP)-based key exchange protocol, when a user would like to transmit a message to another user, the transmitted data are encrypted by a session key exchanged between the two ends of the corresponding connection with the help of the TTP. Up to present, due to the assistance of a TTP, this type of protocols has performed well in protecting messages delivered between two authorized users. Even this, inflexibility, unreliability, and inefficiency problems still exist in these previously proposed protocols. Therefore, in this paper, a multi-key exchange protocol, named the TTP-based high-efficient multikey exchange protocol (THMEP), is proposed to provide users with a secure and efficient protocol, which employs the elliptic curve cryptography, a 2-D operation, and a current time encryption key, to exchange their session keys. The proposed protocol not only effectively hides important encryption parameters, but also achieves fully mutual authentication between a user and his/her trusted server. It can resist known-key, impersonation, replay, eavesdropping, and forgery attacks. Besides, the THMEP generates 40 session keys in a key exchange process, meaning the proposed protocol can support 40 sessions simultaneously. It also shortens the processing time, which is 3.78 times faster than that of a specific previous study. Its security level and performance are higher than those of the compared state-of-the-art protocols. In other words, the THMEP is very suitable for IoT applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decades, with the fast development of wireless communication techniques and mobile services, numerous commercial systems [1] , [2] and e-commerce applications [3] , [4] have been proposed for users to communicate and share their information with other people. However, owing to the insecure nature of wireless channels, many security issues, such as data leakage and personal privacy, need to be carefully addressed when a wireless communication system is being developed and used.
In wireless communication networks, cryptography is often used to protect users' secret data and guarantee integrity of the data. Asymmetric cryptography methods, like RSA encryption algorithm [5] , are often adopted to encrypt delivered messages [6] , [7] . However, the computational costs of these algorithms are relatively high due to employing long keys and complex encryption/decryption processes.
When they are installed in a mobile device, like a smart phone, encrypting and decrypting data often consumes considerable energy and a long time. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [8] is another choice which helps users to establish one or several common secret keys, with which to encrypt and decrypt transmitted messages with a symmetric method.
In fact, many key exchange protocols have been proposed [9] - [12] . Unfortunately, each of them has its own weakness in security and performance. For example, the multiplication of an enormous number of large prime number during the encryption/decryption process consumes a long computational time. Besides, in the key-exchange authentication process, some parameters are static, i.e., they remain unchanged throughout the process. This, in fact, significantly decreases the key exchange security, and implies that the protocol could not defend against eavesdropping attack and replay attack [13] . In particular, Liet al. [11] proposed a useful three-party password-authenticated multiple key exchange protocol for wireless mobile networks, and claimed that it had high efficiency, reliability, flexibility, and scalability. Li's protocol establishes multiple session keys in its key exchanging process and greatly reduces the server's and users' computational costs. Nevertheless, it is still insecure and inefficient due to employing static keys and a complex process.
Therefore, in this paper, we design a multi-key exchange scheme, named the Trusted-third-party-based High-efficient Multi-Key Exchange Protocol (THMEP for short), which provides users with a high-efficient, reliable, and scalable key exchange method for data communication. Unlike certificate authority (CA) issuing digital certificates to users, the Trusted-third-party (TTP for short) is used to authenticate the users and their messages so that two users can safely exchange important parameters.
In the THMEP, a dynamic parameter is derived from a TTP system's clock to encrypt an important exchanged key so as to prevent eavesdropping and replay attacks. Besides, the THMEP mainly uses a two-dimensional operation (including the logical XOR and a binary adder), and reduces the times of invoking the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) multiplications, when encrypting important parameters. The purpose is to enhance its performance since the computational cost of an XOR operation or a binary addition is much lower than that of an ECC multiplication. We will show this later. Our simulation result demonstrates that the time the THMEP consumes is much shorter than the time required by Li's key exchange protocol [11] . Our security analysis shows that the THMEP has a higher security level than those of three state-of-the-art approaches, including replay attack prevention, eavesdropping attack prevention, and forgery attack prevention. The contributions of the THMEP are as follows.
1. Efficiency: Based on the discrete logarithm, the ECC can achieve a higher security level than that of the RSA [14] when their key lengths are the same. Further, a binary addition with a logical XOR operation consumes shorter time than that spent by an ECC operation. Namely, substituting some ECC operations by the binary addition and XOR operation can further reduce the users' and TTP's computation and communication costs. On the other hand, many communication process of the THMEP can be executed in a parallel manner, resulting in a shorter processing time. Furthermore, the computational complexity of the THMEP is much lower than those of existing protocols. So the energy consumption for its key computation is also reduced, thus very suitable for mobile devices powered by batteries. 2. Reliability: The THMEP can protect against many conventional attacks, like replay, eavesdropping, known-key, impersonation, and forgery attacks. The THMEP also provides full mutual authentication between users and the TTP.
High throughput:
A total of 40 session keys are generated in a key exchange process. As a result, the users can create up to 40 individual channels for their following communications.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the preliminaries and the notations used. In Section 3, Li's 3MPAKE protocol [11] is briefly reviewed. The THMEP protocol is detailed in Section 4. The security and performance analyses of the THMEP are presented and evaluated in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. In Section 7, we conclude the study and outlines our future studies.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. RELATED WORKS
Bellovin and Merritt [15] in 1992 proposed an encrypted key exchange (EKE) protocol which integrated a secret key and a public key created to prevent delivered data from dictionary attacks. Ballare et al. [16] presented a method for the password-based authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol which shows the correctness of Bellovin and Merritt's idea. Abdalla and Pointcheval [17] also demonstrated a twopassword-based encrypting key exchange protocol which is more efficient than the one introduced in [15] . However, when two users are communicating with each other, the shared password may be enumerated by hackers by using dictionary attacks. Sui et al. [18] and Lo et al. [19] modified the AKE protocols to improve the effectiveness of Abdalla and Pointcheval's protocol. Sui et al. [18] defined a twoparty authenticated key exchange (2PAKE) protocol which employs the ECC method, and Lo et al. [19] proposed a 2PAKE protocol for wireless networks following the specifications of the 3GPP2. However, their passwords are only chosen from a small space, and their protocols request each pair of users sharing a password, causing the fact that a huge amount of passwords are necessary when many users are involved in such a system.
On the other hand, [20] proposed the three-party passwordauthenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocol to enhance the security of the 2PAKE. In an insecure network, the 3PAKE utilizes a three-party server to help the communication parties to authenticate each other and exchange session keys. Following the approach proposed in [20] , Lu et al. [21] introduced a simple three-party password based authenticated key exchange (S-3PAKE) protocol to eliminate server's public key. However, in [22] , Chung et al. showed that the S-3PAKE is still exposed to impersonation-of-initiator attack, and they used a counter to resist such attack. Nevertheless, [23] indicated that the protocols claimed in [21] and [22] are still vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack and unknown keyshare attack. In order to reduce the communication steps of 3PAKE, [24] designed an efficient 3PAKE protocol requiring neither server public key, nor symmetric cryptosystems. Meanwhile, [25] presented several proposed protocols which are still vulnerable to attacks, such as undetectable 6262 VOLUME 4, 2016 online-dictionary attacks [26] , key-share attacks [27] , and both online and offline password guessing attacks [28] .
Up to present, several studies have been proposed to lower the computation cost and enhance the efficiency of the 3PAKE. Reference [29] pointed out that they reduce communication latency, remove the table for storing keys, and lower the requirement of computational resources. They are essential in improving the efficiency and security of the 3PAKE protocol. However, Yang and Chang [30] figured out that the limitations on communication bandwidth and energy consumption of the 3PAKE have shown unsuitable for wireless mobile networks, hence proposing an efficient three-party authenticated key exchange protocol based on the ECC, and claimed that their protocol has a lower computation cost and lighter communication loads than the 3PAKE has in [31] . In 2012, Li et al. [11] develop a three-party passwordauthenticated multiple key exchange (3MPAKE) protocol for wireless mobile networks, and claimed that it had higher efficiency, reliability, flexibility, and scalability than those of the 3PAKE. The 3MPAKE protocol establishes multiple session keys in its key exchanging process, thus greatly reducing the server's and users' computational costs. Comparing the 3MPAKE with the 3PAKE, the server's computation load of the former is lower when the number of users is large, meaning it is one with better scalability and the server can serve many more users at the same time without dramatically degrading its service performance. Besides, some communication steps in the 3MPAKE are executed in parallel. This further effectively shortens its required execution time.
B. DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY EXCHANGE
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm [6] , which was first published in 1976, enables two users to securely exchange a key to be used in the subsequent message encryption.
In this algorithm, there are two publicly known numbers: a prime number q and an integer α, in which the latter is a primitive root of q. Assume that the users A and B wish to exchange a key. User A selects a random integer X A < q and computes X B mod q. These two equations produce identical results:
The security of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange process heavily relies on the difficulty of calculating discrete logarithms [31] . For large primes, it is considered infeasible.
Key exchange using elliptic curves can be done in the following manner. Let G be a cyclic additive group derived from a public point P, whose order is a prime n. The problems in the additive group (G, +) are as follows.
(1) Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem: Given two group elements P and Q, it is difficult to find an integer x ∈ Z * n , such that Q ≡ x · P whenever such an integer exists.
(2) Elliptic curve decision Diffie-Hellman problem: For a, b, c ∈ Z * n , given p, aP, bP, and cP (P is the generator), it is hard to decide whether c ≡ ab mod q. (3) Elliptic curve computational Diffie-Hellman problem:
For a, b, c ∈ Z * n , gives p, aP, and bP, it is difficult to compute abP.
C. NOTATIONS
The notations used in this study are illustrated and defined in Table 1 .
III. REVIEW OF 3MPAKE PROTOCOL
In this section, we briefly review Li's protocol [11] , i.e., the 3MPAKE, which consists of two phases, including the initialization phase and the authentication and key exchange phase.
A. THE INITIALIZATION PHASE
In this phase, a trusted server S (or simply S or server S) generates system parameters. First, server S selects a finite field F q over a large prime number q, where q > 2 w , and w is the chosen key size. An elliptic curve equation E: y 2 ≡ x 3 + ax + b (mod q) over F q is determined, where a,b ∈ F q , and it satisfies the condition of 4a 3 +27b 2 = 0 (mod q). Meanwhile, server S selects a public point P with the order n over E, and utilizes P to generate a cyclic additive group G of order n over E. S further chooses three hash functions
→ Z * n where U = {0, 1} * and D is a password space with a finite number of passwords. S continues selecting a secure pseudo-random function F, and then publishes the system parameters {G, P,
Assume that users A and B would like to join the system. They choose their own passwords pw A and pw B from the password space D,
individually, and share the verifiers V A ≡ v A P and V B ≡ v B P with the server.
B. THE AUTHENTICATION AND KEY EXCHANGE PHASE
Based on the help of the server S, users A and B in this phase could authenticate each other and generate session keys for the following communication. 
A is calculated by representing k A as a matrix and then computes k A 's inverse matrix as k
Similarly and simultaneously, user B (2.1b) produces three random numbers x B1 , x B2 , and k B where
Round 3:
When individually receiving the two transmitted messages from A and B, server S ( 
and 
which i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
IV. THE THMEP
The THMEP also consists of two phases, namely, the initialization phase and the authentication and key exchange phase. The binary operation used in this protocol is first introduced.
A. BINARY ADDITION/SUBTRACTION
Analogous to the addition on natural numbers, a binary adder adds two binary numbers. For example, let A = 1011 2 , let B = 1100 2 , and let C = A + 2 B. Then, the 4-bit addition yields C=0111 with a carry-out bit 1. This carryout is equivalent to B +B + 1 or A +Ā + 1. Now, we compute
then the ordinary binary subtraction C − B yields the correct result of A. But if C < B, meaning there was a carry-out which was omitted during the addition, then the carry-out has to be added to C − B to produce the correct result of A. We have C −B+ B +B + 1 = C +B+1, or simply
This equation also holds when A and B are n-bit binary numbers.
B. THE INITIALIZATION PHASE
In the initialization phase, system parameters are produced by the trusted server (i.e. the TTP). First of all, the trusted server chooses two large prime numbers q and n and a finite field F q over q > 2 w , where w is the key size chosen. Then, the server (1) specifies an elliptic curve equation E: y 2 ≡ x 3 + ax + b (mod q) with the order n over F q where a, b ∈ F q and 4a 3 + 27b 3 = 0 (mod q); (2) selects a public point P and produces a cyclic additive group G by using P, in which both P and G are of the same order of n over E; (3) selects a secure hash function H 1 : U 7 × G 2 → Z * n ; (4) publishes the system parameters, i.e., {G, P, H 1 }. Assume that user A and user B wish to join the system. 
C. THE AUTHENTICATION AND KEY EXCHANGE PHASE
Under the trusted server's help, users A and B are able to individually generate the same session keys for the following communication by using the following procedure. 
Round 1:
As shown in Fig. 1 
and S A,C ≡ s A,C · P where the subscript C indicates the value is calculated by user A; (5) verifies whether or not S A,C ≡ S A ; If not, it terminates this session. Otherwise, it (6) produces a random number x A ; (7) computes X A ≡ x A P and A substituted by B. Let's omit this redundant portion from this paper.
Round 3:
As shown in Fig. 3 , when S receives message {ID A , x A , X A } from user A, and {ID B , x B , X B } from user B, it 
Analogously, user B
( 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the security of the THMEP is evaluated.
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Let X and Y be two keys, each of which is m bits in length. According to the proofs proposed by Huang et al. [32] , [33] , the probability p with which to recover the value of (X , Y ) from illegally intercepted X ⊕ Y on one trial is p = 1/2 m . The recovering probability of X + 2 Y is also 1/2 m . By using these two fundamental concepts, probability p with which to Proof: According to previous description,
where (1) The trusted server decrypts x A to obtain x A by using s A , k CT and k pwA (see Step (7) of Round 2).
(2) The trusted server checks to see whether or not X A,C = X A in Step (2) of Round 3.
These two steps imply that only the hackers who have acquired the parameters s A and k pwA can correctly generate the values of η A in Step (1) of Round 4 for user A. Hence, only the legitimate user who has parameters x A , s A , and k pwA can generate the correct η A , i.e., η A,C = η A (see Step (2) of Round 4). Those illegitimate hackers who have no correct parameters x A , s A , and k pwA cannot achieve this.
User B has the similar phenomena and description. But let's omit them here.
(Proof of Nonrepudiation): From the analysis above, only the legitimate user who knows the parameters x A , s A , k CT and
Step (2) of Round 4). This shows that the message is sent by the one who has those valid parameters, indicating that the user is a legitimate one. Q.E.D. [28] , the 3MPAKE [11] , and the THMEP.
B. SECURITY COMPARISON
The THMEP protocol provides mutual authentication and is secure against five popular attacks. Table 2 compares the security among the THMEP and other related protocols, including Chen et al. [29] , Yang et al. [30] and the 3MPAKE [11] .
1) FULL MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
In the THMEP, each round of the authentication and key exchange phase has its own authentication mechanism except the first round. In Step (5) of Round 2, user A verifies the trusted server's message by checking the equality of S A,C and S A . Only the legitimate server who knows k PWA can pass the verification. In Step (2) of Round 3, the trusted server verifies user A by checking the equality of X A,C and X A . Only legitimate user A who owns correct k PWA can correctly decrypt s A to obtain s A and then generate valid X A to pass the verification. In Step (4) of Round 3, S verifies user B with the similar method. In Step (2) of Round 4, user A verifies the trusted server by checking to see whether or not η A,C = η A . Only legitimate server who has the parameters s A , x A and k PWA can correctly generate valid η A , and pass the verification. In Step (4) of Round 4, user B does the same.
Hence, the THMEP is a full mutual authentication protocol. However, the 3MPAKE [11] and the two schemes in [29] and [30] lack an authentication mechanism between user A and the server in their Round 2s, which may cause forgery attack and decrease the efficiency of finding invalid users. Namely, the 3MPAKE, Chen's scheme [29] , and Yang's system [30] only individually provide a partial mutual authentication.
2) REPLAY ATTACK
Assume the trusted server would like to send messages to user A, and a hacker Z intercepts the messages and disguises himself/herself as the trusted server to transmit them to user A. In this case, user A in the 3MPAKE can successfully authenticate Z by its key exchange procedure, meaning that there is no mechanism to prevent this protocol from the replay attack. In the THMEP, Theorem 2 shows that it can defend the attack effectively.
3) EAVESDROPPING ATTACK
When Z captures a large number of messages from the underlying network, he/she may be able to obtain some important parameters, such as user's password. In the 3MAPKE, some keys are fixed and static, for example, the verifier v A is derived from user A's password. If user A does not change the password, the verifier v A will remain unchanged. Hence, it is relatively easier for Z to extract important parameters from captured messages. In the THMEP, the password keys k PWA and k PWB are encrypted by time key k CT (see Step (3) of Round 1) which is dynamic for different sessions established at different time points. Thus the parameters generated to protect delivered messages and keys in different sessions also vary. Even though Z has captured a large amount of messages from the network, he/she is still unable to extract users' keys from the captured messages. Hence, the THMEP is able to thwart the eavesdropping attack.
4) KNOWN-KEY ATTACK
This type of attack occurs when a hacker knows the key. He/she can find the ciphering mechanism, resulting in the fact that the keys generated later may be exposed. In the THMEP, as mentioned above, the session keys established for a session are quite different from those generated in other sessions. If Z can obtain one of the previous session keys, he/she still does not know those time keys and random numbers used to generate those session keys for later sessions. Thus, the THMEP can prevent the known-key attack effectively.
5) IMPERSONATION ATTACK
When Z wants to impersonate user A, he/she intercepts the message sent by the trusted server to user A in Round 1, and guesses s A from the captured message. However, due to the lack of correct k PWA , according to Theorem 1, Z cannot correctly decrypt s A to obtain s A , and hence cannot correctly generate x A since he/she does not have parameters s A and k PWA . Thus, Z is unable to pass the verification performed in Step (2) of Round 3, showing that the THMEP can effectively defend the impersonation attack.
6) FORGERY ATTACK
In Round 1, Z may pretend himself/herself as the trusted server by issuing a valid S A and a valid s A (see Step (3) of Round 1) which are invalidly captured. However, the captured s A is encrypted by k CT which is the current time encryption key of the trusted server, i.e., k CT is derived from t nonce,S (see Step (1) of Round 1). If Z sends a fake t nonce,S in Step (3) of Round 1, then a wrong s A will be generated in
Step (4) of Round 2 and cannot pass the verification in Step (5). Furthermore, Z may generate a fake message which is sent to S in Step (3) of Round 1. However, he/she does not know the correct values of K PWA . Therefore, the correct value of s A cannot be generated in Step (4) of Round 2. In other words, the message cannot pass the verification process, meaning that the THMEP can effectively defend the Forgery attack. Table 3 summarizes the time consumed by seven operations (as shown) on key sizes of 160 bits, 256 bits, 512 bits, and 1024 bits. The simulation is performed on a notebook computer with 1.6GHz Intel Atom CPU, 1GB RAM, Windows XP operating system, and C++ compiler. It is clear that an ECC point multiplication consumes the longest computation time compared with those consumed by other operations. That means the ECC multiplication is the dominant factor in the total computation time and contributes most of the computational cost. Note that in the 3MPAKE, the server undergoes 48 ECC multiplications.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The performance comparison between the 3MPAKE and the THMEP is presented in Table 4 when four session keys are generated. We assume that the size of P, the output size of hash function, and the size of user's identity are 160, 160, and 32 bits, respectively. The computational costs for different parties (user A, user B and S) are shown in this table. Although the logic XOR operations and binary additions are more frequently used in the THMEP, the number of ECC multiplications employed is reduced from 48 to 16. Fig. 5 depicts the total computation time of the 3MPAKE and the THMEP. As the key length increases, the total computation time of the THMEP grows slower than that of 3MPAKE. In average, the processing speed of the THMEP is 3.78 (=14.42/3.81, taking 1024 bits shown in Fig. 5 as an example) times that of the 3MPAKE. Table 5 shows the performance improvement (PI) achieved by the THMEP over the 3MPAKE on different key lengths where PI is defined as the time consumed by the 3MPAKE over the time spent by the THMEP on a specific key length.
PI Key length =
the time consumed by the 3MPAKE the time spent by the THMEP Overall, our protocol utilizes less ECC multiplications and saves a significant amount of computation time. In the 3MPAKE, the relatively high computation burden of the trusted server has lengthened its communication latency and then the response time. Hence, the THMEP can keep higher performance improvement even when the key length is longer, that is, the THMEP provides higher security level and better scalability than the 3MPAKE does when their computation times are the same.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE STUDIES
In this paper, we propose the THMEP to enhance the computational performance and security level of the key exchange process in mobile communication. Comparing with previous studies, the THMEP has lower computation and communication costs and provides 40 session keys. The processing speed of the THMEP is 3.78 times faster than that of the 3MPAKE when the key length is 1024 bits. Besides, the THMEP is reliable since it can resist replay, eavesdropping, knownkey, impersonation, and forgery attacks, and offer full mutual authentication. In other words, the THMEP has the features of high efficiency, scalability, reliability, and throughput, and is in particular suitable for mobile applications.
In the THMEP, the important parameters s A , s B , x A , and x B are encrypted by the two-dimensional operation, time key and users' passwords. Although the computation costs have been greatly reduced, as shown in Table 4 , a total of 16 ECC multiplication is still required. They mainly come from Round 4 of the authentication and key exchange phase. Thus, how to reduce the number of ECC point multiplication is an important issue for further improving the THMEP's performance. In addition, the energy limitation of mobile devices is also a key factor in developing an adaptive THMEP for heterogeneous environments. We would also like to derive the reliability model, energy model and behaviour model for the THMEP so that users can know its reliability, energy consumption and behaviours before using it. These constitute our future studies. YI-LI HUANG (M'13) received the master's degree from the National Central University of Physics, Taiwan, in 1983. He is currently an Associate Professor with Tunghai University, Taiwan, and the Director with the Information Security Laboratory. His research interests include security of network and wireless communication, solar active-tracking system, pseudorandom number generator design, and file protection theory. 
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